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This paper presents a theory of inductive learning (i-learning), a form of induction which is neither concept learning nor hypothesis-formation, but rather which takes place within the autonomous and modular representational systems (levels of representation) of the language faculty. The theory is called accordingly the Autonomous Induction Theory. Second language acquisition (SLA) is conceptualized in this theory as: learning linguistic categories from universal and potentially innate featural primitives; learning configurations of linguistic units; and learning correspondences of configurations across the autonomous levels.
Here I concentrate on the problem of constraining learning theories and argue that the Autonomous Induction Theory is constrained enough to be taken seriously as a plausible approach to explaining second language acquisition.
I Introduction
The central problem of a theory of second language acquisition (SLA) is the explanation of how language-specific constituents, constructions, forms and form-meaning correspondences are acquired, in a particular order, by particular types of learners, at a particular stage of acquisition, given particular types of stimuli. Such an explanation must include all those phenomena which occur in interlanguage systems while disallowing those that never do. No current theory can claim to do all of these things. The most popular proposals fail in one of two ways. Approaches originating in the theory of grammar, not surprisingly, provide a 'property theory' of linguistic competence but have no serious account of development (Principles and Parameters Theory; see White, 1989; LarsenFreeman and Long, 1991; Sharwood Smith, 1994; Towell and Hawkins, 1994) . Approaches originating in psychology, equally unsurprisingly, provide a 'transition theory' and are more compatible with current work on memory, but have difficulty characterizing the precise constraints which acquired linguistic competence exhibits (the Competition Model; see Bates and MacWhinney, 1981; . 1 Other approaches have problems on both of these fronts (Bley-Vroman, 1997; R. Ellis, 1985; O'Grady, 1996; 1999) . None of these approaches has seriously addressed the issue of how stimuli in the speech stream can become 'input' to a learning mechanism acquiring the very abstract, rich and language-specific kinds of knowledge that even far-from-perfect second language (L2) learners exhibit on a daily basis.
2 In Carroll (1999) I laid out the foundations of such a theory of input. My purpose here is to present an outline of a novel theory of SLA, the Autonomous Induction Theory (AIT). It assumes a highly articulated property theory of language (from phonetics to semantics); it takes very seriously the problem of explaining the constrained nature of language acquisition (Epstein et al., 1996) ; its major goal is to describe and explain the stages, developmental orders and time course of SLA.
3
II A definition of i-learning
The AIT is a theory of induction built around the premiss that language acquisition occurs in an autonomous faculty of mind (Jackendoff, 1983; . Standard discussion of acquisition in SLA contrasts parameter-setting models and language-learning models concerned with hypothesis-formation and hypothesis-testing, problem-solving, concept learning and so on. One is supposed to infer from such discussions that there is nothing else. The AIT is something else. Let me begin, therefore, by drawing a distinction between inductive reasoning, which takes place in that part of the mind computing conceptual structures, and inductive learning (ilearning), which affects representations within the autonomous Susanne E. Carroll 225 226 Induction in a modular learner systems of the language faculty. 4 Inductive reasoning is associated with problem-solving. It is a form of inferencing based on the contents of conceptual structures (Johnson-Laird and Wason, 1977; Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Carston and Uchida, 1998) and will play a role in SLA to the extent that inferencing and the contents of conceptual representations define a learning problem. Inferencing surely has a role to play in the interpretation of linguistic instruction, explicit feedback and negative evidence, see Carroll (1995; 2001a) , but 'playing a role' leaves entirely unstated how information encoded in one type of representation (conceptual structures) could come to be encoded in completely different autonomous representational formats (the phonetic, phonological or morphosyntactic) needed to perceive, comprehend and produce speech. To play a role in grammatical acquisition, concepts have to map onto (or be put into correspondence with) morphosyntactic representations or phonological representations. These correspondences are actually extremely restricted. Inductive reasoning is, therefore, not directly involved in how a learner acquires a set of contrastive segments, the combinatoric constraints on prosodic categories like syllables, feet or prosodic words, or the distributional properties of morphosyntactic categories like himself or each other, which require antecedents in very precise syntactic domains. For similar reasons, I argue that the acquisition of grammatical categories is not equivalent to learning the concept of a grammatical category. This is precisely the reason why 'learning about the language' does not enable one to use it, as generations of language students and language teachers can attest. Moreover, conceptual categories are not stand-ins for grammatical categories because the correspondences between levels are imperfect. Investigation of, at first glance, 'obvious' syntactic-semantic pairs quickly reveals messy correspondences which defy explanation of morphosyntactic categories in terms of the learning of conceptual categories, as the study of the acquisition of gender has clearly shown (for discussion, see Carroll, 1989 ).
Acquisition must make it possible to process a language in listening to or reading stimuli, and in producing speech or writing. The AIT thus relates acquisition mechanisms to speech processing mechanisms by, first of all, identifying the analysis of speech stimuli as the critical locus of acquisition. It hypothesizes that processing mechanisms are innate and operate automatically and outside of conscious control.
5 Processing procedures, in contrast, are i-learned and reflect both the structural and frequency properties of the first language (L1). By hypothesis, therefore, speech perception, word recognition and sentence parsing procedures, attuned to the properties of the L1, transfer automatically in the attempt to deal with L2 stimuli. 6 Initially, these procedures normally fail in that they cannot analyse information at one autonomous level relevant to defining constituents at another level. Or, they cannot integrate information within an autonomous level into a structure because, for example, the linear order of constituents is not the same in the two languages (say, the L1 has Adj N order but the L2 has N Adj, or the L1 has SVO order and never SOV while the L2 has SOV).
The AIT thus proposes the Uniform Parsers Hypothesis to explain two things:
why acquisition has to take place; and why there are a variety of phenomenological consequences to being an L2 learner.
To the best of my knowledge other approaches do not have an explicit account for the former and do not acknowledge the latter, which includes such things as hearing the speech stream initially as continuous noise and not as sequences of 'words' -an as yet unstudied phenomenon from a developmental perspective -being able to detect a phonetic feature in a discrimination task but not being able to 'hear' it when processing words in sentences (see the chapters in Strange, 1995b) , hearing L2 stimuli (often quite different in acoustic form from an L1 word) but 'thinking' an L1 cognate word or a 'klang associate' (Carroll, 1992; Pal, 2000) , morphologically misparsing words by, for example, using syllable-based procedures (something I do all the time in reading German, which is not my L1), or misconstruing sentences because one has failed morphosyntactically to integrate a critical element occurring late in the sentence which happens to have scope over the predication (like negation does in German); for example, Sie kaufte den Rock dann Susanne E. Carroll 227 5 It follows that much current theorizing claiming that acquisition must be conscious is misguided (Schmidt, 1990; . I certainly have seen no evidence that any of the kinds of acquisition problems raised by linguists are acquired only under conscious control. 6 Note that this is not the same thing as claiming, as Schwartz and Sprouse (1994; do, that the grammar of the L2 automatically transfers (the 'Full Transfer Hypothesis'). Schwartz and Sprouse systematically fail to distinguish between competence grammars and processing mechanisms, treating the former as if they were a substitute for the latter. However, grammatical information takes different forms when rendered in parsing and production models, and many of the grammatical constructs they advert to in their theory may not be formalizable in performance. Consequently, I suspect that their hypothesis may not be empirically testable. The AIT is.
distribution.
eben nicht 'She buy+past tense the+acc skirt then so not', which means 'So she didn't buy the skirt', but construing the sentence to mean 'She bought the skirt'.
7 These effects are the result of the processing system failing to do its job.
1) The Uniform Parsers Hypothesis: Linguistic stimuli are processed by the same parsers regardless of their linguistic 'origin'. Initially, L1 parsing procedures apply automatically to L2 stimuli.
We can anticipate (and anecdotal evidence suggests) that transferred parsing procedures will mostly fail in the early stages of exposure to the L2. A major part of L2 learning involves acquiring L2 appropriate parsing procedures, in the general sense that that is what i-learning amounts to, as well as in the more particular sense that the i-learning of form extraction procedures at the phonetic level will permit the transfer of phonologymorphosyntax correspondence rules which, then, permit the transfer of morphosyntactic parsing procedures, which will fail, thus triggering more acquisition. The transfer of L1 parsing procedures leading to parsing failure which then triggers the acquisition mechanisms constitute an ever recurring cycle of processes until the system reaches stasis. What happens when parsing fails? The moment of parse fail creates a 'learning problem', which the acquisition mechanisms must attempt to resolve. In the AIT, consequently, input to parsers and input to acquisition mechanisms are very different things. In particular, input to the acquisition mechanisms is, in part, whatever entities are in the current parse string that the extant parsing mechanisms cannot parse. This basic observation led me to formulate the slightly oversimplified generalization in:
2) I-learning begins when parsing fails. 7 Note that the first type of experience is quite mysterious within the interactionist and consciousness paradigms, which apparently assume unrestricted flow of information from the conceptual level to the grammar. Imagine lesson 1 of 'Shona for Beginners', a Bantu language with tone. The teacher arrives and begins speaking. The learner might be struck by the 'singsongy' nature of the speech, but cannot hear words in the continuum. Nonetheless, he or she can see the interlocutor's lips move, think 'Ah, that must be Shona', and watch the teacher's face and gestures. Knowing that Shona sentences must consist of sequences of words will not help to hear them in the absence of appropriate acoustic-phonetic integrative procedures, correspondence procedures between the phonetics and the phonology that will define the prosodic word, and additional correspondence procedures between the phonology and the morphosyntax that map prosodic words onto morphosyntactic words. It is not an accident that experienced teachers make use of translation and writing systems in helping learners to locate words in the speech stream in courses like 'Shona for Beginners'.
Basically I think this is correct, although something must be said about internal restructurings of representations in long-term memory of the sort which lead to the more abstract representations we think probably constitute knowledge of the phonological repertoire of a language. These clearly constitute an important part of the developmental problem. Also of importance is an account of the time course of the emergence of production schemata used when attempting to say the L2. I will ignore this latter aspect of SLA entirely (see Poulisse and Bongaerts, 1994; Poulisse, 1997; Pienemann, 1998a; 1998b) . Thirdly, also to be left aside here, is the developmental nature of the automatization processes which define efficient parsing and fluent speech production. The creation of new parsing procedures does not mean that these automatically replace the L1 parsing mechanisms. Parsing procedures which can analyse the same string will compete for activation and the one with the lowest threshold of activation level will fire. Although the speech processing and speech production literature dealing with L2 learners or bilinguals is still small, both provide ample evidence that the linguistic systems of learners and bilinguals interact constantly. 8 I-learning has been defined to explain how perceptual and parsing mechanisms come to be adjusted by acquisition mechanisms so that they can analyse novel stimuli. I-learning is defined as:
3) I-learning is a process that leads to the revision of perceptual and parsing procedures so that they can analyse novel stimuli made available to the organism through the perceptual systems. I-learning is not inductive reasoning. It is also different from mechanistic responses to environmental change in that the results of i-learning depend upon the contents of symbolic representations in working memory and long-term memory.
I-learning changes procedures that result in unit detection and unit storage, word recognition and sentence parsing. I-learning is simultaneously an encoding process capable of altering parsing procedures so that they can construct representations. But such a formulation raises the question: 'How is the encoding system induced?' My answer is: It isn't. Human beings come equipped with the capacity to encode speech in terms of autonomous representational systems. They do not learn the primitives of Susanne E. Carroll 229 8 Current research on bilingual language processing suggests that the L1 is always activated even when the speaker is using the L2 in an exclusively L2 context (Hermans et al., 1998 ; on control in speech production, see also Green, 1986 ; on comprehension and production, see Green, 1993) . Voss (1984) provides a systematic study of how German L2 learners of English misparse unstressed syllables. The phonological patterns of stress placement in German are similar to that of English but the acoustic consequences are quite different (Pompino-Marschall et al., 1987) . Archibald (1993) provides evidence of L2 learners misperceiving stress location due to the influence of the L1.
distribution.
autonomous representational systems, nor the basic operations of the parsers just as they do not learn to 'have' a parser or speech production mechanisms. These things constitute part of the basic human language-making capacity. One way to think about Universal Grammar (UG) is that it consists of the representational primitives of the initial representational capacity for language, plus the encoding operations.
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III The nature of the i-learning problem
There are four major problems that a theory of SLA has to describe and explain: Speech is a continuum. Language, in contrast, is perceived and processed as units. The first task the learner faces is to build up a repertoire of units and to do that he or she must 'break into' the speech stream. One of the central issues raised by language acquisition is what is known as the constancy problem: there is no simple correspondence between stretches of the acoustic signal and the traditional segments of nineteenth and early twentieth century phonetic and phonological description, a fact that raises major problems for associative learning theories. Winifred Strange writes:
The problem of perceptual constancy arises because there is no one-to-one correspondence between phonemes as perceived and the acoustic patterns generated by speech gestures that constitute the stimuli for speech perception. Thus, many physically different acoustic patterns may be categorized as the same phoneme (many-to-one correspondence), and even more inexplicably, the identical acoustic signals are often categorized as different phonemes (one-tomany correspondence) when they occur in different contexts, or in utterances produced at different speaking rates or spoken by different talkers. In the face of this lack of invariance in the speech stimulus, a basic question to be 9 I draw a distinction between operations, which are the basic types of things which parsers can do -e.g., unification of features and making identity statements across autonomous levels of representations, and procedures, which are the language-specific implementations of operations. Operations are not i-learned, but procedures are. 10 I have listed these problems in the relative order in which I think they generally occurlearning how to extract sounds from the speech continuum, identifying formatives in the sense of Mohanan (1995) as exponents of morphemes, learning how morphemes embody morphosyntactic features and are organized into structures. The order in which certain phenomena emerge in parsing and comprehension and in production should follow from the theory (see Pienemann, 1998a; 1998b) .
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addressed is how humans come to be able to categorize acoustic patterns correctly. That is, how do listeners recover the phonetic segments intended by the talkers, thereby achieving perceptual constancy? (Strange, 1995a: 5) 11 The problem of perceptual constancy is essentially the problem of how variable and nondiscrete forms of information at one level of linguistic representation can come to be interpreted as a cue to the presence and boundaries of a constituent at another level of representation. Once grammatical knowledge has been acquired, the presence of particular types of information in the string being parsed can signal the presence of other kinds of features or units because they have a limited or even unique distribution. How are cues acquired? In particular, how are cues to extractable phonological units acquired? Given problems with the hypothesis that we compute strings of phonemes, attention has turned recently in the speech recognition and first language acquisition literatures to units larger than the segment, namely the syllable, and the domains of stress and intonation, such as the foot and the intonated phrase (Lahiri and Marslen-Wilson, 1991; Jusczyk, 1997) . Consideration of these units allows us to ask how L2 learners identify prosodic words in the speech continuum. In the theory of Prosodic Phonology (see Selkirk, 1981; 1984; Nespor and Vogel, 1986) prosodic words have a technical definition. They are a domain where certain phonological processes occur. 12 In addition, however, prosodic words can be defined psycholinguistically, namely as the minimal unit of phonology relevant for accessing entries in longterm memory.
13 It follows from the theory of i-learning here that learners ought to be able to extract phonological units once they have i-learned certain phonetic regularities which are then used as Susanne E. Carroll 231 11 Ioup (1996) raises this issue in a critique of N. Ellis (1996a) . Ellis' (N. Ellis, 1996b) response is to dismiss the problem because the variability between the acoustic cues to syllable-initial and syllable-final voiceless obstruents has been modelled in a connectionist paradigm. This is hardly a serious response since formal modelling always incorporates quite specific assumptions about the nature of the problem, which invariably oversimplify it. The problem of invariance is not just that the cues to segments differ according to their position; they differ depending on whether the speaker is male or female, adult or child, has braces on his or her teeth, has chewing gum in his or her mouth, and so on. This problem will not, of course, disappear. 12 Alternatively, the prosodic word can be defined as a domain subject to certain wellformedness constraints, as in Optimality Theory. The prosodic word also can be used to define the minimal word of a language (Prince, 1980; McCarthy and Prince, 1990) , thus providing an account of listable or free morphemes that have this property, see McCarthy and Prince (1995: 320-25) . 13 It is well known that all sorts of domains can ultimately be 'listed' in the mental lexicon, from bound morphemes to entire sentences. On the one hand, the morphological structure of particular languages precludes listing every word (Hankamer, 1989) ; on the other hand, idioms have unpredictable meanings which cannot be derived from computing the meanings of the individual words (for relevant discussion, see Sandra, 1994 .) This does not preclude the idea that prosodic words are the initial basis for determining listable items.
cues to prosodic words (mappings at the phonetic-phonology interface). Learners ought to be able to learn 'form-meaning correspondences' because they make a correspondence between the acquired phonological units (the prosodic words) and word classes (units of the morphosyntax; hence, the phonology-morphosyntax interface), on the one hand, and the identified word classes and concepts on the other (the morphosyntax-semantics interface).
Note that the issue of how forms are extracted from the speech stream is a separate one from explaining, in developmental terms, how the initial representations of prosodic words change over time to become well-formed prosodic words in the sense of phonological theory, i.e., as domains in which target language phonological processes and the right kinds of phonological contrasts occur. Thus, the problem of (4a) is a separate issue from the problem of describing and explaining developmental paths in the acquisition of the phonology of a language. It is conceivable that various kinds of sound representations could be extracted from the signal and stored in long-term memory. Similarly, form extraction is also a distinct issue from that of how phonological formants are identified as instantiations of morphemes (a particularly thorny issue in the acquisition of derivational and inflectional morphology). It is an important issue to determine whether phonological learning and formant learning are driven by parsing failure, or whether they involve gradual re-representations of information already stored in memory, driven perhaps by internal constraints on storage and links among lexical entries. For the purpose of clarity, I adopt the former position, but I suspect the latter is, in fact, true.
Phonology is, alas, SLA's neglected child. There is very little good data on the topic of how L2 learners identify and extract prosodic words. Presumably, as elsewhere, cross-linguistic influence (or transfer) will be a part of the story. The theory certainly predicts that learners will attempt to transfer the L1 minimal prosodic word to the problem of form extraction, transferring as well the procedures sensitive to particular cues at the phonetic level of representation. Thus, anglophones will, by hypothesis, attempt to transfer a correspondence rule which maps their minimal prosodic word, essentially a foot structure that provides the domain of stress placement, onto the morphosyntactic word.
14 It follows that they will use patterns of alternating strong and weak syllables in the 14 Once the learner has put the prosodic form into correspondence with a morphosyntactic unit (and by extension with a semantic unit), he or she can ask questions like: 'What does . . . mean?' Whenever a learner asks this question, he or she is assuming that the phonetic form articulated (symbolized here by the square brackets) does indeed correspond to a lexeme, a fact that can lead to considerable confusion on the part of listeners when the learner has misparsed the stimulus.
input to locate the edges of prosodic words. English words, of course, differ in their stress patterns by word and morpheme class (Chomsky and Halle, 1968) . They also differ in the frequencies of these patterns (Kelly, 1988a,b) . It stands to reason that an anglophone might initially attempt to identify a stressed syllable as the left edge of a prosodic word.
15 What needs to be determined with appropriate empirical studies is the role of stress and other possible transferred cues to word boundaries (such as nondistinctive acoustic features) in extracting discrete units in the L2. In particular, we need an account of how instability at the acoustic level is introduced into the system by the i-learning of new acoustic cues, and how this leads to redefining for the L2 the prosodic word.
The problem of extracting units from the speech stream is really the problem of forming constituents of any type; (4b) asks: How are constituents formed? Constituents are complex entities, with a representational identity at a given level of representation (their formal characterization) which combine with the cues we use to locate them. Distributional cues are bits of relevant information that function at the same level of representation as the cued unit, for example, when we use the presence of the feature and subcategorization frame [+Definite], [ NP] to locate the left edge of a Determiner Phrase in the morphosyntax. Correspondence cues are bits of information at one level of representation that signal the presence of a constituent or of a configuration at either a higher or lower level of processing. A pattern of weak-strong stress could be taken as a cue in English that the first syllable corresponds to a functional category and the second to at least the left edge of a lexical category. The simultaneous occurrence of absence of stress and the acoustic correlates of the interdental voiced fricative could be a cue to the presence of the definite determiner le ('the'). As in the Competition Model (Bates and MacWhinney, 1981; , in the AIT too, cues to categories compete.
Susanne E. Carroll 233 15 In the absence of hard data, let me use an anecdote to illustrate. The first word that I was able to pick out of running speech in learning German (aside from my name, which is almost invariably nativized by Germans as /suzan / and a few interactive words like ja and nein) was /fas + [+nasal]/. I experienced this as a clear rendition of /fas/ and was not sure about the rest of the word, but thought I might have heard either fassung [fasuy] or fassen [fas n]. Subsequent questioning of the bilinguals in the room made it clear that the stimulus word had been Verfassung. Note that in breaking into the speech continuum, I had extracted a two-syllable unit whose first syllable was stressed, ignoring the initial more weakly stressed unit of the real word. Studies of speech perception and first language acquisition have made clear the importance of stress as a cue for setting word boundaries. I assume that stress domains may also be treated by L2 learners as cues to word boundaries. Although no substitute for experimental studies of perception in SLA, reports of what the learner experiences of the sort one finds in diary studies (see, for exampler, Schmidt and Frota, 1986) can be a particularly useful adjunct to the actual acoustic detail. Cue competition is required to explain both aspects of development and aspects of linguistic competence. Cue competition is one mechanism used to explain how instability can arise in the internalized system. New types of information, or the same types but in different frequencies or in different combinations, are being presented to the system. What is a 'good cue' for the L1 will not be a 'good cue' for the L2. The absence of cues will, by hypothesis, hamper the work of correspondence processors. Secondly, proficient parsing does not emerge as soon as the learner has encoded novel information. Proficiency emerges over time. The competition of various stimulus-dependent solutions to a parsing problem will be necessary before general properties of the solutions can be identified by the system. Thirdly, linguistic categories have prototypical properties just like other categories (Rosch, 1973; 1975; Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Rosch et al., 1976; Ross, 1972; 1973a; 1973b; Taylor, 1989; . This can be seen as the consequence of various configurations of cues being used in the prototypical cases, with specific cues being more important in the atypical cases. Frequency of a cue and its relative success in competition with others thus matter to i-learning and are encodable in the theory.
How are structures built up out of the discrete units that the learner has extracted, analysed and classified? How does the learner learn to construct feet from syllables? Or prosodic phrases from feet? How does the learner learn the well-formedness constraints on each of these types of units? The problem of learning structures is at the heart of the major controversies regarding nativist vs. empiricist discussions of language acquisition, because the constraints on various kinds of structures in languages are not expressed in the stimuli and are so abstract and so specific to language that it is difficult to imagine how they could be anything other than the product of a language-specific a priori system, i.e., a Universal Grammar. Let me turn briefly to this problem, leaving a fuller discussion of the constraints problem for another occasion.
IV Autonomous representational systems, speech processing, and their relation to language acquisition
The AIT is a highly constrained theory of learning. It expresses various kinds of operations in terms of classifier systems and condition-action rules, drawing on prior work by Holland et al. (1986) . These have a quite simple format, namely a set of conditions that must hold for an operation to take place, and an operation that occurs when the conditions are met; see (5) The central issue for any theory of SLA is to impose constraints on what operations the condition-action rules can perform. Many of the constraints on the function of these operations derive from the functional architecture of mind adopted and some well-motivated assumptions about language processing (for fuller discussion, see Carroll, 2001a) . The most important constraint is the adoption of the Autonomy Hypotheses. It follows from their adoption that there can be no domain-general theory of acquisition pertinent to the acquisition of grammars. While certain aspects of induction within a faculty will share properties with induction in other domains (such as the prototypical nature of categories and categorization judgements just mentioned), 16 the autonomy of our faculty representational systems is a by-product of our genetic endowment. The AIT thus assumes that some version of UG is an essential part of how we define the language faculty. However, it rejects the idea that UG is an acquisition mechanism, and rejects as well the idea that language acquisition literally (as opposed to figuratively) consists of setting or resetting parameters, or re-ranking constraints.
The AIT bears the name it does because it is framed in terms of autonomous levels of representation, 17 see (6): 6) Hypothesis of Levels: a. Each faculty of mind has its own characteristic chain of levels of representation from lowest to highest. b. These chains intersect at various points. c. The levels of structure at the intersections of chains are responsible for the interactions among faculties. d. The central levels at which 'thought' takes place, largely independent of sense modality, are at the intersection of many distinct chains. (Jackendoff, 1987: 277) Susanne E. Carroll 235 16 The AIT was specifically designed to explain the prototypical nature of conceptual categories like BIRD. Categories in this theory are not primitives but rather complexes, associated with sets or clusters of rules. The prototypical nature of categories can be explained in terms of the competing cues for the identification of the presence of a category, e.g. HAS WINGS, HAS FEATHERS, LAYS EGGS, HAS A BEAK, HAS A BILL, CAN FLY, CAN SWIM, etc. This aspect of the theory carries over directly to the AIT. 17 In a discussion of faculty psychology, Fodor observes (Fodor, 1983: 21 ) that vertical faculties are not supposed to compete with each other for horizontal resources in language processing; (see note 18). He calls this computational autonomy. In referring to my theory as the AIT, I intend the notion more along the lines of Chomsky (1957: 92-103; 1975: 41-43) in which formal constructs are distinguished from conceptual constructs, on the one hand, and acoustic-phonetic constructs, on the other hand, in such a way that neither conceptual constructs nor acoustic-phonetic constructs appear in the formal representations of the morphosyntax and, conversely, morphosyntactic constructs never appear in the representations of the phonetic and phonological systems or of the conceptual system. This covers only part of what Jackendoff (1990) calls Representational Modularity.
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These assumptions are to be taken as universal claims, and therefore hold true of humans of all ages, including L2 learners.
18
In the case of the language faculty, I assume that at least the following levels of representation are needed, but the correctness of the i-learning theory does not hinge on the correctness of (7).
7) Levels of linguistic representation:
acoustic-phonetic/ phonological morphosyntactic conceptual motor-articulatory Given the Autonomy Hypotheses, the theory requires that speech processing and language production involve two different types of processor, whose nature has been alluded to in previous sections. On the one hand, at each level of representation there are integrative processors, processors that build structural representations. On the other hand, there are correspondence processors which map representations in one autonomous system onto representations of another. The correspondence processors are the processors that deal with the kind of cues discussed in Competition Model research -for example, phonological and semantic cues to subject function -although researchers in that paradigm would undoubtedly reject this interpretation of how to characterize the analysis and application of cues. The organization of parsing is made more precise in (8)-(10). (See Jackendoff, 1987; Carroll, 2001a; 2001b.) 8) Bottom-up correspondence processors: a. transduction of sound wave into acoustic information (via peripheral and central auditory analysis); b. mapping of available acoustic information into phonological format; c. mapping of available phonological structure into morphosyntactic format; d. mapping of available morphosyntactic structure into conceptual format. 9) Top-down correspondence processors:
a. mapping of available conceptual structures into morphosyntactic format; b. mapping of available morphosyntactic format into phonological format;
18 Fodor (1983: 1-38) describes the structure of mind by making a distinction between the so-called vertical faculties -e.g., language, number, face-recognition, spatial cognition and so on (Fodor, 1983: 14-23 ) -and the horizontal faculties (Fodor, 1983: 10-14) -namely, perception, attention, memory, imagination and judgement.Vertical faculties are individuated by reference to the contents of the representations typical of a domain. Thus, we distinguish the language faculty which deploys representations which mention constructs like [+voice], [ Adj ] and NP, from the faculty of visual object recognition that deploys representations which mention constructs like edges, terminations and blobs (Marr, 1982) . Horizontal faculties are individuated by reference to the processes they perform.
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10) Integrative processors:
a. mapping of newly available phonological information into unified phonological structure; b. mapping of newly available morphosyntactic information into a unified morphosyntactic structure; c. mapping of newly available conceptual information into a unified conceptual structure.
Each processor is modular because it accepts as input and output only a specific and restricted kind of representation. Nonetheless, the language faculty itself functions in an interactive way. It is not, in particular, merely an 'input system' to the conceptual level of representation, as Fodor (1983) and Schwartz (1986; 1999) , citing him, have claimed.
Mappings across representational formats are severely constrained. Jackendoff (1997: 23) has formulated correspondence rules to have the shape of (11):
For example, an expression which is a prosodic word at the phonological level may or may not correspond to a morphosyntactic word at the morphosyntactic level; see (12). and other bound morphemes will be contained in Prosodic Words but map onto their own terminal elements in a morphosyntactic representation (a fact that can only emerge from an analysis of the morphosyntax of sentences containing these morphemes, and an analysis of sentence meaning, from which it follows that these formants will only be identified after the prosodic forms have been extracted and morphologically analysed). The initial starting point of L2 acquisition appears to include the ability to map the contents of extant lexical entries, including L1 morphosyntactic categorizations, subcategorization frames, argument structures, thematic roles and the mappings of arguments and roles onto L2 forms (see Harley, 1989; Harley and King, 1989; Izumi and Lakshmanan, 1998; Juffs, 1998 , and the articles in Montrul, 2001 ). The Competition Model research has also clearly demonstrated that language specific cues to grammatical relations -such as linear order, intonation or case marking -transfer (Kilborn, 1987; Kilborn and Cooreman, 1987; Kilborn and Ito, 1989) . These cues are partially associated with the contents of lexical entries. These and other studies confirm the lexical entry as being a major source of cross-linguistic influence (Kellerman, 1987; Odlin, 1989) This kind of transfer is to be expected if, as Jackendoff suggests, 'words' really are sets of cross-level correspondences. This means that we should formulate correspondence rules not only for 'bottom-up' relations but also 'top-down'. The AIT includes correspondence rules like those in (13). 238 Induction in a modular learner distribution.
The correspondence rule of (13a) is designed to capture so-called 'semantic bootstrapping' of first language acquisition. The rule in (13b) is designed to capture the fact that adult learners are capable of expressing definite and indefinite reference in their early interlanguage, even when conventional forms of determiners are missing. 20 Consider, the following data, taken from Madan in (Huebner et al., 1992) . 14) girl stealing one shop. one woman coming back. woman see (xxx) girls bread stealing. girl go. after woman telling shop gaffer 'see girl bread stealing' gaffer telephoning police. police coming. charlie and girl accident. charlies bread come pickup. police telling charles 'you bread stealing' . . . gaffer telling charlie 'sorry policeman' he dont stealing bread stealing bread GIRL. (Huebner et al., 1992: 70) Madan appears to use one to express indefinite reference and no overt prosodic form to express definite reference (Huebner et al., 1992: 72) . The structure 0 + noun is also used for indefinite referents which might be confused with definite referents already introduced into the story-telling (recall that the task involves recounting the story of a Chaplin film Hard Times) or nonreferential expressions.
In the absence of information about the prosodic properties of the text, we can only assume that 0 + N is the default mapping.
In any theory of grammar that hypothesizes that semantic distinctions project into the syntax as morphosyntactic distinctions (e.g., all functional theories, plus Montague Grammar, Head Driven Phrase Structure Grammar and Minimalism), it follows that Madan must be capable of projecting definiteness features into his morphosyntactic representations. Indeed, despite the general claim that interlanguage lacks functional categories, data like that in (14) suggest that older learners are perfectly capable of expressing the concepts which functional categories conventionally express. Either we assume that the constructs are represented in the morphosyntax of the interlanguage representations of such learners (but not the phonology), or we abandon the fundamental claim that morphosyntax is an expression of both sounds and meanings. In the AIT, this metatheoretical problem disappears because we can define the changing expressive capacity in terms of changing correspondence configurations, e.g., at this stage the conceptual units PERSON and OBJECT correspond to a morphosyntactic word which in turn corresponds to a prosodic word. At a later stage, Susanne E. Carroll 239 where definite reference is expressed over a morphosyntactic configuration, the correspondence rule will indicate this and will presumably be triggered by, on the one hand, Madan's representing the prosodic forms of determiners and, on the other hand, his discovery of their morphological status.
The overall organization of the components of the grammar is given in Figure 1 . As noted, lexical items are considered to be correspondences in so far as a lexical entry will associate with a 'word' a conceptual representation (word meaning, semantic class restrictions, argument structure, s-selection information, semantic role assignment properties), a morphosyntactic representation (word class, subcategorization or c-selection information, morphosyntactic subclasses information such as gender, person or number subclass) and a phonological representation (segmental specification, syllable structure, stress representation, tone).
We can anticipate the following phases of i-learning:
15) Phases of i-learning: Phase 1: i-learning of acoustic phonetic patterns to feed the integrative parsers at the acoustic-phonetic level. Initial attempts at correspondences based on transferred parsing procedures. These will often fail, but presumably will sometimes succeed if the languages are similar enough (presumably something like this happens when we listen to unfamiliar varieties of the same language). Phase 2: As i-learning at the acoustic phonetic level proceeds incrementally, subsequent attempts to map onto prosodic words will be more successful, leading to the i-learning of correspondence rules. Figure 1 The organization of the grammar Source: Jackendoff, 1997 :100 distribution.
Phase 3: As i-learning of novel lexemes proceeds (both Phase 1 and Phase 2), the learner will store multiple representations of the same expression and simultaneously encode its distribution with some kind of neighbouring information (i.e., Wong Fillmore, 1976, formulae). These can provide bottom-up cues to the morphosyntactic distribution of words. L1-based correspondence rules mapping particular types of concepts onto morphosyntactic frames (transitivity patterns, ergativity patterns, etc.) can be triggered at this point. Phase 4: As cues compete for correspondences to morphosyntactic words and phrases, the morphosyntactic integrative parser will be provided with i-learned structures.
Modelling this on Karmiloff-Smith (1992) , I have referred to these as phases because they must be assumed to be recurrent.
V Constraining induction
I-learning a language is construed as:
1) learning linguistic categories from universal and potentially innate featural primitives; 2) learning configurations of linguistic units; and 3) learning correspondences of configurations across the autonomous levels.
Categories will, at a given level of representation, consist of configurations or matrices of primitive features, the vocabulary of which is provided by UG. UG, I hypothesize, will also severely constrain the ways in which the features can combine to form hierarchical structures. 21 However, as noted, much of what we will want to say about how categories are acquired will involve specifying the correspondence rules that map from one level of representation to another. There is only one mapping operation type, shown in (11). What has to be acquired are the specific correspondences of particular languages. Similarly, there may only be one type of operation used in the construction of configurations within the autonomous representational formats, namely unification. What has to be acquired are the language specific constraints on configurations.
A final set of constraints in the AIT are designed to reflect the interaction of working memory and learning mechanisms and do Susanne E. Carroll 241 21 Practitioners of the Principles and Parameters Theory, or Minimalism, will presumably be most interested in this issue in order to make direct comparisons with their favourite grammatical analyses. It is early days for me yet on the question of specific analyses of particular morphosyntactic problems, but I will say that the formal framework that I am currently pursuing is that of constraint-based grammar formalisms (Shieber, 1992) , which is the foundation for a number of non-derivational theories of morphosyntax, all of which are about as stable as Minimalism.
distribution.
not need to be stipulated; however, I include them for the sake of clarity.
16) More constraints on i-learning:
a. I-learning begins at the point where a current parse fails. b. In generating new representations, the learning mechanisms can alter only those representations currently active. c. The representations currently active are those relevant for parsing a current string. d. The learning mechanisms will restructure the grammar only on the basis of the resources of the modular parser, i.e., restructuring of the grammar to deal with an attachment problem will be limited to featural changes of the categories to be attached. Restructuring of the grammar to deal with a correspondence problem will be limited to changing the nature of the correspondence. Simplifying, we may see this as a 'one-change-at-a-time' constraint.
Constraint (16a) is a formulation of the idea, characterized in Carroll (2001a) as the Detectable Error Hypothesis, namely that ilearning occurs when there is a discrepancy between some input to be parsed and what the system can currently analyse. I-learning is the response of the system to the fact that the parsing system has 'crashed' in mid-parse, or else has produced an interpretation that is incompatible with existing conceptual representations (the 'you said WHAT?' phenomenon). When the system fails in this way, it is said to have detected an error (Wexler and Culicover, 1980: 122; Culicover and Wilkins, 1984; Wilkins, 1993/94) . Constraints (16b,c) restrict modification of the parsing procedures to what can be processed in working memory. These constraints will exclude some of the wild types of innovations that induction is sometimes supposed to lead to (see Epstein et al., 1996) . Constraint (16d) makes clear how modularity of the type envisaged and the limitation to a small number of operational types (essentially mapping configurations, and unification) will greatly restrict the types of solutions the learning mechanisms can adopt to fix a parse fail. In addition, the theory includes certain constraints on the interaction of competing solutions, namely the Specialization Constraint, the Unusualness Constraint, the Law of Large Numbers Heuristic and the Logical Implication Constraint, taken over from Holland et al. (1986) . (For fuller details, see Carroll, 2001a.) These proposals are quite limited and are not sufficient to explain why learners follow particular developmental paths in acquiring some phenomena but not others, nor will they explain the nature of variability of learning (see Clahsen et al., 1983) . I assume that some of the explanation for these things will emerge from a theory of input and descriptions of the effects of particular kinds of stimuli 242 Induction in a modular learner distribution.
and input on the learning process. The constraints on structurebuilding need to be worked out in much more detail, as do the constraints on the correspondences themselves. Finally, the AIT, when explored empirically with respect to the acquisition of given linguistic phenomena, will undoubtedly reveal more constraints. I leave this for future research. Let me conclude here by saying that psycholinguistic models and theories have reached a sufficient degree of sophistication to be taken more seriously by SLA researchers, in particular by those of us who are convinced that the 'generative enterprise' is well motivated and correct in its general thrust, if not always in its details. At the same time, formal models of natural language grammars and natural language parsing reveal the considerable limitations of the Principles and Parameters Theory. Such research raises serious questions about the nature of 'explanation' in SLA and the direction that the field has taken over the last 10-12 years. It is absurd to reject the notion that learners induce their second languages, in precisely the sense intended here, that is to say that they induce the categories, configurations and correspondence rules of the L2. Presumably no sensible researcher would. But then we might well ask why there have been so few attempts to elaborate a theory of induction relevant to SLA data within the SLA generativist paradigm.
VI Conclusions
In this article I have introduced a theory of i-learning, which builds on work on induction by Holland et al. (1986) and on the functional architecture of mind by Jackendoff (1987; . Their work has in turn been developed to account for a wide range of behavioural data (both linguistic and nonlinguistic). I claim that the AIT is constrained. One major set of constraints emerges from the functional architecture of mind and the nature of processing itself, as well as the way in which the theory of i-learning is integrated into the theory of parsing. A second major set of constraints emerge from the adoption of specific formal theories of grammar, which are less concerned with logical necessity as with descriptive adequacy and psychological plausibility. My contribution to the enterprise has been to see the relevance of these theories for the domain of second language acquisition. The challenge now is to test the AIT empirically.
